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Abstract
After setting the scene for an examination of the changes in culture and self-
perception in China today, the authors explore three areas of activity which can be 
interpreted as illustrating these changes: (1) the current treatment of Confucius, as 
compared to the recent past; (2) the enthusiasm for the Chinese canon, which has 
developed from a grassroots movement into government policy; and (3) the way in 
which the presentation and content of public slogans have changed to, apparently, 
reflect the substitution of Communist nostrums for Confucian mores. In the first and 
second cases, the authors suggest that the authorities are acceding to the aspirations 
and prejudices of the people; rather than leading, they are following, and this has the 
effect of reinforcing the trend. The third—the gradual abandonment of the use of 
Marxist shibboleths in propaganda, and their replacement by Confucian adages—is 
not yet an established fact but, again, the trend is evident. China has revised and 
modernised its traditional culture and the first fruits of that can be seen in the words 
and behaviour of its political and intellectual leaders.
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In 2016 President Vladimir Putin visited Mount Athos, in Greece, one of the holiest shrines 
of Orthodox Christianity, as if to set the seal on the rejection of Marxism as the guiding 
vision for Russia. His nominally Communist counterpart, President Xi Jinping, preceded him 
by three years in making such a gesture. He visited the birthplace of Confucius in 2013, 
becoming the first Communist leader so to do.
A good Marxist would say that both men are attending to the superstructure; the failure of the 
economic revolution led to the return of a market economy in both countries (although more 
successfully in China than in Russia) and ideology must reflect that. Another way of looking 
at this is suggested by Dikotter (2015), who argues that Deng Xiaoping is not to be 
congratulated for noticing that Communism was dysfunctional and freeing up the economy 
from central control; it was the people who in desperation restored market society and he was 
obliged to follow them and abandon Marxist economic policies. The same may be happening 
in the cultural sphere, whereby the leaders are acknowledging that they must go along with 
the reincarnation of tradition: where the people lead, the leaders follow.
The Communist overthrow of the established order in Russia and China, in 1917 and 1949 
respectively, took place at times of great disruption and weakness. Energetic populists, 
proselytising a millenarian religion which promised cake for all once the guilty (rich 
peasants, businesspeople, free thinkers) had been abolished, seized control and proceeded to 
centralise all political and economic power in their own hands, eliminating potential critics, 
termed “class enemies”. They then proceeded to substitute their own ideology for the 
traditional identity. In China’s case, the natural law religion of Marxism, a derivative of 
Christianity, was comprehensible to Buddhists, but antithetical to Confucians: “Like 
Buddhists, Communists believed in a superhuman order of natural and immutable laws that 
should guide human actions. Whereas Buddhists believe that the law of nature was 
discovered by Siddhartha Gautama, Communists believed that the law of nature was 
discovered by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin” (Harari: pp 254).
Although Buddhist notions are influential in China, the ideological bedrock, certainly of the 
literate echelons, was Confucianism. Among them, a fanatical and missionary secular religion 
such as Marxism, millenarian and exclusive, was only likely to take shallow root. Lenin’s 
elitism, his organisational methods, and his extreme materialism were invaluable to a sect of 
revolutionaries but, once these same revolutionaries had taken power, were the opposite of 
what was required to develop and modernise a country. In the period from 1949 to the 1980s, 
the clumsy brutality of the Marxists and the irrelevance of their policies to the Chinese 
situation soon became obvious to anyone with the courage to think. This state of affairs has 
been best recorded in novels, for example those of Mo Yan, Yu Hua, and Yan Lianke. 
In the early 1970s, when the incompetence of Marxoid economic policies started causing too 
much suffering to be ignored, the people quietly rebelled. They started planting and trading 
privately; this obliged the power-holders to reverse their policies and claim the credit. At this 
point, instead of the Party’s problem being “we have a vision that we are struggling to 
impose”, its difficulty became one of “we have a vision which is an embarrassment because it 
neither reflects our society nor provides a helpful story or identity.” Shi Yinhong (2004, 228) 
has described graphically the contempt for Marxism that became widespread in the 1990s. 
The Chinese people came to the rescue. Notwithstanding the persecution or elimination of the 
educated, the thoughtful, and the public-spirited that took place between 1949 and 1979, and 
despite the destruction of the relatively enlightened political and legal arrangements of Sun 
Yatsen’s Republic, China has been able to draw upon its cultural resources to start rebuilding 
the ruined temple. Chinese society’s famous yen for cooperation (often referred to as 
collectivism), and its reliance upon interpersonal trust, role reverence (filial piety), passion 
for learning, and deep respect for the human being who has maturity and experience to share, 
provided the capital resources for economic take-off (Hofstede 2015 passim). The ways in 
which Chinese culture has made possible the successes of the 1980s and 1990s have been 
adumbrated for us by (mainly American) economists and anthropologists (Perkins 2000).
Culture is never static, but we can confidently say that although the application of Marxist 
superstitions by Leninist methods has destroyed much, it did not wipe out the fundamental 
aspects of Chinese culture sketched above (Feuchtwang 2015). And these have their 
superstructure to reflect and reinforce them: once hunger and penury had been overcome in 
the 1990s, families began to rebuild their ancestral halls and dig up their genealogies, villages 
rebuilt shrines, and teachers opened schools to rescue and pass on Chinese learning.
The government had already in the 1980s re-instituted civil service recruitment by 
examination on the model favoured since the Han Dynasty; decision-making was once again 
localised and central direction was to be implemented through personnel appointments rather 
than through violent campaigns. Tacitly acknowledging the irrelevance of Marxism, cadre 
training now nearly avoids it altogether (Pieke 2016). Since President Xi’s ascent he has 
consistently exhorted his compatriots to see themselves as the heirs and exponents of a great 
Chinese tradition and opined that China has a vision of itself and its role in human civilisation 
equal to any American Dream. He cannot abjure Marxism publicly, but he is giving new 
relevance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by talking of it as the spearhead of a 
Chinese renaissance.
Preceding Studies
The abovementioned developments in Chinese identity and its reconstruction have been 
observed by academics at least since the 1990s. However, initially they were seen as 
nationalist, with all the negative overtones that nationalism holds for Europeans and 
Americans. Wang (1996), Unger (1996), and Gries (2004) published notable books on 
nationalism, but it was Guo Yingjie, in 2004, who refocused attention on the various 
epiphenomena of nationalism and asked us to see them, less pejoratively, as identity 
construction in his work Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for 
National Identity under Reform (Guo 2004). Based upon Anderson’s notion of “imagined 
communities” that depend upon cultural fictions, Guo examined, from several different 
angles, how new conceptions of identity were being expressed by historians, Confucians, 
those who wish to revive traditional written language, and “postcolonialists” for whom 
Communism was “colonial culture”. One of the threads running “through the whole discourse 
of cultural nationalism … is an unwavering conviction that China has strayed from its own 
natural path” (Guo 2004: 112) on account of the Communist revolution and Westernisation. 
In 2006 Xin Xu tied analysis of the issue of identity construction to the particular 
circumstances of the Olympics. The article “Modernizing China in the Olympic Spotlight: 
China’s National Identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad” (Xin 2006) connected sports 
policy and the staging of international mega-events as building blocks in identity formation.
Subsequent years saw the publication of a stream of monographs on various aspects of neo-
Confucianism, generally seen as the foundation for an emerging national consensus about 
identity and values. For example, Li and Witteborn (2012) have found Confucian values 
returning in screen drama. Writing on a larger canvas, Daniel A. Bell’s China’s New 
Confucianism (2008) has identified an ideology that was developing as an alternative to both 
Western liberalism and Marxism-Leninism. A burgeoning Chinese perspective was that of 
the “protection of Chinese culture”, exemplified by Li (2008), who has argued that cultural 
security is as important as food security or defence security in a world “threatened” by 
globalisation, implicitly seen as a vehicle of US capitalism. Yan Xuetong (2011) has shown, 
in Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, how ancient Chinese concepts have re-
emerged in international relations theory and are increasingly likely to be deployed by 
Chinese political leaders. 
In 2016, Cheng Chen surveyed Russia, Eastern Europe, and China in order to argue for the 
recognition of a process through which all states go as they make the transition from one 
form of political organisation to another. The process is not just one of constructing new 
institutions, but of providing a “sense of mission” and policy guidelines. He declared such a 
construction essential for legitimacy and analysed which factors determine the success of 
such a project. (Cheng 2016). 
Below, we continue this thread by looking at three movements in the restoration of Chinese 
identity: the resurrection of Confucius, the growing importance of the Chinese canon in 
schools, and the changed nature of official exhortations since 2000.
Confucius
Sun Yatsen sought to marry Western and Chinese ideas about polity and society and 
respected Confucius. The sage was denigrated after the Communist takeover. During the 
Cultural Revolution, remaining vestiges of his teachings or his influence—found in books, 
statues, memorial arches, ancestral temples, and tombs—were destroyed in bonfires. 
Today Confucius is back in favour; some speak of “neo-Confucianism” as modern media 
interpreters provide a sanitised version that attracts 21st-century Chinese. Lecture 
programmes abound; the most successful of the many was a series called “Learning from 
Confucius” by Yu Dan (、、AA、、), transmitted in 2006. Its companion volume, Confucius 
from the Heart (Yu 2008), sold well. In 2014–2016 another lecturer, described as a talk show 
host and broadcasting online with a reported 900 million views, had great success in 
discussing topics relating to the Confucian tradition. Gao Xiaosong’s Xiaosong qitan (、、、A), 
the talk show on iQiyi, is controversial and the style is authoritative and even at times 
aggressive; it draws on Gao’s wide scholarship and deep reflection.
Oscillations in the treatment of the master are not extraordinary to those familiar with 
Chinese history. Such demotions and revivals—including the rise of neo-Confucian 
movements—have been witnessed at other times, even thousands of years ago (Morris 2010). 
Some aspects of Confucianism were revealed, immediately after the ascent of Deng 
Xiaoping, to have been merely hidden out of sight: the intense belief in the healing properties 
of education, how the family is conceived and operates, views on the bureaucracy and its 
central role, as well as the urge to harmony (Jacques 2012). The aspect of harmony in 
particular was most visible during the Hu Jintao years, with an official CCP goal being to 
build a “harmonious socialist society”. During Hu’s years, a statue of Confucius appeared 
just off Tiananmen Square, at the north gate of the Chinese National Museum (renovation 
completed in early 2011) in the centre of the capital. Its appearance in such a location, 
important politically as well as philosophically, was an indication of changed priorities, even 
though the statue, placed in January 2011, was removed in April of the same year. (Huang 
2011)
President Xi Jinping has gone much further in rehabilitating the sage, his adherents, and his 
ideas, in complete antithesis to Mao Zedong. In addition to promoting traditional Chinese 
culture on a more general level to all, the Xi administration obliges senior government 
officials, as part of their in-service training, to attend lectures on Confucianism presented by 
academics who would once have been labelled reactionaries (Page 2015). The establishment 
or restoration of temples honouring Confucius has been given unprecedented attention; 
recitals of the analects and many other closely associated activities and rituals are no longer 
low-profile, one-off events (Osnos 2014). 
President Xi, the first CCP leader to give a speech in commemoration of Confucius’s birth 
(Xi 2014b), has visited the birthplace of Confucius, with its great temple and many 
memorials.  He makes more references in his speeches to Confucian thinkers than to any 
other category (Sun 2014). He conveys the message that socialism is really a Chinese 
invention—did not the emperors hold their mandate only when they served the people? He 
has stated that “the people hold the country together” (、、、、), “governance requires the 
people’s support” (、、、、), and “both civility and law are required to govern” (、、、、) (Xi 
2015 passim).
President Xi has suggested a Chinese “exceptionalism” in much the same way as 
anthropologists have described Anglophone exceptionalism. He said, according to the 
People’s Daily, “Several thousand years ago the Chinese people trod a path that was different 
from other nations’ culture and development” and has called upon the people to draw upon 
“5000 years of continuous Chinese culture”. (Tatlow 2014).  Other Confucian thinkers are 
repeatedly mentioned by Xi. He provides quotations from classic texts that buttress the idea 
that socialism with Chinese characteristics has its origins not in Western thought but ancient 
Chinese philosophy. Chinese civilisation is the culmination of several thousand years of 
achievement, and the point of reference for the Chinese people (Xi 2014b).
The Canon
A decade ago the road to Shaolin was already lined with schools—primary and secondary—
in the vast courtyards of which hundreds of children exercised, wearing costumes 
traditionally associated with the martial arts. This was one product of a growing 
determination by parents to seek indigenous schooling for their children and a by-product of 
what is loosely referred to as the “national studies” (guoxue) movement. Today millions of 
children are learning about the intellectual and artistic heritage of Chinese civilisation, which 
may have a much greater impact than emphasising martial arts.
The term “guoxue” was already in circulation in the early 20th century and is thought to have 
been invented by the doyen of Chinese journalism, Liang Qichao (Xie 2011 p1). Zhang 
Binglin, (1867-1936) a noteworthy scholar and activist, used the term to refer to the educated 
Chinese way of looking at the world and cultural heritage. He founded the Society for the 
Discussion of the Chinese Canon (、、、、、) to stimulate a renaissance of Chinese learning at a 
time when Western schooling was replacing traditional Chinese education, at least among the 
educated families of the eastern provinces. Zhang argued that, for China to preserve its 
identity and for the Chinese themselves to have a foundation for life, the canon must be 
preserved and adapted to the modern world and educated Chinese should incorporate useful 
lessons from outside rather than be swamped by foreign learning.
After 1949, the CCP was ambivalent towards the canon, up until the Cultural Revolution, 
when all education was jettisoned and a complete destruction of inherited culture was 
attempted. In the 1980s there was debate about political institutions, rivalling the great 
debates of the early 20th century which led to the founding of democratic institutions. 
However, the debate was snuffed out in 1989 following the head-on collision between 
political leaders and naïve and intransigent students and others, whose demonstrations were 
crushed on June 4, 1989.
From 1991 onwards, and thanks to the initiative of Deng Xiaoping, the briefly stalled 
modernisation programme revived, leading to the world-shaking results with which we are 
familiar today. After the failed attempt at political revolution in the 1980s, the enthusiasm of 
patriots and intellectuals focused on cultural development, particularly the canon. Gradually, 
Marxism-Leninism came to be seen, except by the far left, as a foreign imposition of little 
relevance to China (Shi 2004) and the Westernisers looked to the USA, so obviously more 
successful materially than the USSR, as the lodestar. Those suspicious of Westernisation, and 
those who now saw Marxism-Leninism as an earlier kind of Westernisation, advocated a 
return to Chinese roots and the study of Confucianism and of traditional culture, literature, 
and philosophy. By the 2000s, there were many schools offering the canon either as their core 
curriculum or as part of it. 
There has been a number of milestones. In 1993 two articles were published in the leading 
national party newspapers, in effect “legalising” the movement. The People’s Daily 
published an article entitled “Guoxue quietly comes back to Peking University” and the 
Guangming Daily published “The charm of guoxue and the guoxue masters”.(Bi 1993) Two 
years later, at the annual National Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a group of scholars 
called for the establishment of schools for the study of the Chinese classics. (CPPCC 1995) 
In the late 1990s, many small independent schools calling themselves Confucius academies 
were inaugurated. They deliberately chose the term “academy” (AA)—from the Tang Dynasty 
onwards it had been academies that offered the education necessary for official and business 
life, and which aimed to cultivate students’ moral integrity, educate them on ethical 
principles, and develop their general level of culture. When China’s technological and 
organisational backwardness vis-à-vis 19th-century Europeans was made manifest, families 
began to prefer the new Western-style schools that were being established to give their pupils 
the skills needed for industrialisation, rearmament, and, ultimately, resistance to the 
globalisers. However, this did not mean that they abandoned their own socialising 
responsibilities; these had always been seen as the duty of the family as much as that of the 
school, and when traditional lessons were excluded from the school curriculum the family 
simply accepted the challenge of compensating, arranging for private tuition in the classics, 
music, and calligraphy. Chinese families in the USA operate in a similar way today, seeing 
the (American) school as providing only a modicum of the education needed by the child 
(Huang and Gove 2012). 
In China itself, the implicit understanding that China’s successes over the last 30 years have 
come about as functions of Chinese culture rather than of Westernisation has altered 
perceptions of schooling, as of so many other things. The culture that kept Chinese 
civilisation going longer than any other human endeavour is now seen not merely as a token 
of distinctiveness, but as the source of achievement. 
Today, there are many academies. Among the most famous is the Chengxian Canonical 
Institute (AAAAAAA) in Peking, situated in the Imperial Academy (AAA) where, from the 14th  
to the late 19th century, officials took their civil service exams and where today once again 
the pupils wear traditional robes and recite classical Confucian texts. Others include the Four 
Seas Confucius Academy (AAAAAA) and the Peking University Academy of Erudition (AAAAA
AAA).
 
Although there are hundreds of these specialist academies, the main impact of the canon is 
probably in the general schools, in which guoxue classes have become a significant 
component. To bring the older generation up to speed, universities and private colleges have 
also set up such classes. Tsinghua, the author’s own university, has a Guoxue Department. 
CCP personnel also take guoxue courses. In 2014 the Ministry of Education required more 
lessons on traditional culture to be added to the curriculum in both primary and secondary 
schools. (Ministry 2014) By an interesting coincidence, this occurred at about the same time 
as there was discussion in Beijing education circles about reducing the weight given to 
English in the high school curriculum.ACity 2014A
As to the content of guoxue today, an investigation of some of the most widely circulated 
textbooks for Early Years and primary classes will reveal that they are about teaching 
manners, behaviour, and the acknowledgment of dependence. These are complemented by 
prettily produced versions of the great children’s classics, Rules for Siblings (AAA)AThe 
Analects of Confucius (AA), and The Three Character Classic (AAA). As in the past, young 
children recite them. When asked how much the children can actually understand, the 
response from the pedagogues is that understanding of the classics varies from age to age; the 
young child will have a limited comprehension but when he/she matures will grasp a great 
deal more and, later, the adult will be able to draw on the full wisdom of the classics once 
experience of life and study has readied him/her. In addition, the approach to learning helps 
train memory and concentration. When asked why they promote these studies, teachers and 
parents will both say that moral education is a priority, that it is the fundamental basis (AAAA
A), that a child must learn to be a good, cooperative, and therefore moral member of society 
before anything else. In practical terms, older children should look after young ones, all 
children should understand their interdependence with their parents and grandparents, and 
learning moral stories from the past helps with problem solving.
In sum, the guoxue movement represents a resurgence of Chinese culture and is an expression 
of the confidence felt in China’s ability to reassert itself as a civilisation that is at least the 
equal of the dominant Anglo-American one. We foresee academics and pedagogues 
becoming less obsequious towards Anglo-American norms and more inclined to build on the 
Chinese intellectual and artistic traditions to investigate and analyse the world. After nearly 
100 years of denigration—following 200 years during which Europe overtook China in many 
fields, to such an extent that Chinese intellectuals lost confidence in their own tradition—it 
will take time for this rejuvenation to be fully realised. Nevertheless, today there appears to 
be a powerful and widely shared will for a renaissance of Chinese civilisation to drive China 
forward.
Official Exhortations
The average Chinese construction site is never dull. Observers find adages and admonitions, 
usually printed in white characters on red, adorning everything from scaffolding to elevated 
tracks on high-speed railway sites. In the Deng era, reform policies were advertised using the 
slogan “Raise high the banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (AAAAAAAAAAAAAA) 
reminding everyone of key official policies. Later, modest calls to “realise the Three 
Represents”  (A‘AAAA) or “Let the country be subject to the rule of law” (AAAAAA) to a great 
extent replaced the old political harangues. The banners of today seem not to be aimed at a 
select audience, but instead at anyone who happens to catch sight of the signs at any given 
moment. One example is: “Because we have our nation therefore we have our home” (AAAA
A).
Such signs are as old as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) itself—or probably older, 
since decorating walls and door frames with ideograms is surely a centuries-old custom. The 
only difference today is that the newer form of propaganda tries to merge into the landscape. 
The tone seems to be less urging, more amusing, with traditional folk art posters and “cute” 
public awareness video clips designed to “endear” themselves to the populace. These hardly 
seem to constitute government propaganda.
Since 2000, two particular changes have been most visible. Under Hu Jintao there was a slow 
transition to the theme of harmony, a great contrast to the Leninist priorities of class struggle 
and the persecution of victims, and a theme derived from the wise Chinese sages of yore 
rather than any Marxist. The viewer was almost certainly expected to compare the harmony 
of his/her own country with the news from abroad, which made a point of illustrating the 
horrors of the Iraq and Afghan wars and, later, chaos in Libya and Syria. Many internet 
memes that have been in circulation have shown that people were well aware of the message 
that the government was trying to put across when it contrasted “socialist harmony” with 
murder and mayhem in the Muslim world and the casual violence of US society. As for the 
slogans, although the methods of expression remained the same, the content became 
progressively less “red” and more homely. The following are some examples:
• Cheerfully get to work, safely go home. (、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、)
• Speed up development; promote railway technology; give greater contributions to 
creating a well-off society! (AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA)
• Good parenting, good care and good education: benefits for nation, people and family. (A
AAAAAAAAAAAA)
• China is good at chess. (AAAA) [The slogan is accompanied by an image of two youngsters 
in traditional Chinese dress, playing chess.]
• Effort is repaid. (AAAAAA) 
The second, and probably more important, visible change is in the way government messages 
are being communicated since the ascent of Xi Jinping. By contrast with Hu’s rise in 2002, 
Xi’s rise in 2012 was completed within half a year, in which time Xi obtained all the main 
leadership posts necessary to make his power as comprehensive as the system allows. Since 
1989, photo montage has dominated propaganda posters (Landsberger, 2016). In the run-up 
to the 18th Congress of the CCP, the posters that adorned cities, especially Peking, featured 
messages in golden characters with a faint background pattern, the banner itself being made 
of more durable material. Such minor details can be indicative of the increased importance 
being attached to propaganda by the authorities. After Xi introduced the “Chinese Dream”, 
posters around the capital were considerably more focused on traditional values and the 
promotion of an idealised Chinese lifestyle (Qiu 2015) rather than promoting politics—
although, we should not forget, the socialist road and rule by the Party were still praised. Xi’s 
views have not only been promoted inside China, but also overseas by means of books (see 
Carlson 2015). The following are some examples of propaganda posters, photographed 
mainly in the capital:
• The key values of socialism (AAAAAAAAA) areAaffluence and strength  (AA) democracy(A
A),  civility(AA), harmony (AA), liberty (AA), equality (AA), justice (AA), legality (AA), 
patriotism(AA),  professionalism(AA), sincerity (AA), kindness(AA). [Often accompanied by 
pretty pictures of jolly families spanning three generations]
• Love of country, creativity, tolerance, and virtue. (AAAAAAAA)
• Be brave enough to seek excellence; celebrate the 18th Congress; compete for new 
achievement. (、、、、, 、、、、, 、、、、、, 、、、、、)
• The people are happy. (姓姓A)
• China’s dream is an auspicious dream. (AAAAAA) [with a poem]
• China’s dream is my dream. (AAAAAA) [with an image of a child dreaming)
• China’s dream is the Metro’s dream. (!) (AAAAAA)
• The good children of China. (AAAAA)
• When China’s dream is perfect, everybody benefits. (AAAAAAAAA)
• [With three very pretty pictures done in the traditional style] (1) On with the dream. (AAA
A) [an image of a boat and oarsmen]; (2) You reap what you sow. (AAAAAAAA) [a girl 
picking fruit while a boy plays the lute]; (3) The country and you should treat each other 
with a mother’s profound affection. (AAAAAA) [a baby being carried on the back of a 
mother)
• The people have beliefs (AAAAA);  the nation has hopes  (AAAAA); the state has strength(AA
AAA).
Gentle though the slogans now are by comparison, mobilisation is probably not off the cards 
entirely. It was deployed during the effort to combat SARS in 2003 (Zhao 2008). And 
perhaps that is what the constant references to the “Chinese Dream” are about, albeit in more 
seductive, less authoritarian tones. The national concept is often referred to in tandem with 
more local concepts; thus, a “Metro dream” can be seen in a propaganda poster in the Beijing 
underground. A multitude of “dreams”, derived from the central concept “China Dream”, can 
be seen to express a form of mobilisation where the incentive is to excel at work, to the 
benefit of the wider “dream” and rejuvenation efforts across the country. If you share the 
“dream” and sign up for its component objectives, whether it be building a good subway, 
loving the motherland, or playing chess, you also accept the legitimacy of those exhorting 
you. 
Legitimacy is another theme, with the citizenry encouraged to believe that their political 
leaders have an unshaken, unchallenged right to govern .  The CCP is represented as 
legitimate because it ejected the evildoers (including foreigners) and because it really knows 
where China is going and can take it there. Legitimacy appears to be continuously “enforced” 
in a variety of ways, whether by banners stressing the “correctness” of rule by the Party or 
through campaigns such as “No Party, no new China” (、、、A、、、、、、、).
We can question the efficacy of these slogans, even in a country with a long tradition of this 
practice and great respect for the written word. Social media in particular have changed the 
ways in which erstwhile “all-official” media and propaganda outlets have had to 
communicate their message. The audiences too have changed; there is now a cohort of young, 
opinionated, but also comparatively less well-off professionals or would-be professionals 
who like to take part in public conversations (Chen and Yu 2012). Officialdom has had to 
learn to communicate in many other ways and to converse rather than command (de Burgh, 
Zeng, and Mi 2012). Newer methods may need to be employed when the authorities want to 
issue a rallying call to action (Qiu and Chan 2009).
Returning to the slogans, the changes we have noted have gone further than merely 
moderation in tone or pragmatism in content. Co-author Feng notes that on a visit to the 
village of Liqiao, in the northeastern suburbs of the capital, in the summer of 2014, he found 
no less than five direct quotes from traditional Chinese philosophers, including Confucius 
and Mencius, positioned next to “regular” propaganda encouraging greater civility in 
accordance with the socialist and collectivist lifestyle. Among the precepts presented in the 
conventional propaganda mode were the following:
• Should you not know how society works, you cannot establish yourself. (AAAAAAAAAAAA
• He who knows speaks not; he who speaks knows not. (AAAAAAAA)
• Those who have a good name have it because they have understood virtue.  (、、、、、AAA、
A)
• Cultivate and discipline your moral life, admire virtue and incline to what is good, being 
modest and considerate of others. (AAAAAAAAAAAAAA)
Should these precepts stand, it will be a clear sign that the Party is now openly drawing upon 
the great thinkers and leaders of China’s past and that Marxist-based propaganda is likely to 
be superseded by a revitalised form of Confucianism.
Conclusion
Academic attention has been paid to how China is reconstituting its identity, and to the many 
and diverse forms of evidence of that process. As we reviewed above, these changes were 
initially viewed as epiphenomena of nationalism, but have latterly been seen as the 
reassertion of traditional values in a modern context. It is in both the words of leaders and the 
activities of the population that these reassertions can be seen. 
After the horrors of the Cultural Revolution and the disillusionment of the 1980s, people 
began to reassess their own heritage and—in terms similar to the thinkers of the early years of 
the 20th century, such as Hu Shih—to seek a road to modernity drawing upon China’s 
civilisation rather than an ideology of repudiation which could, if successful, turn China 
either into a Russian or an American cultural satellite. At least that is how many 
commentators began to view the situation. 
We have offered three phenomena as providing further evidence of this ideological shift: the 
rehabilitation of Confucius, the re-establishment of the Chinese canon as a core part of 
education and cultural life, and the alteration in the content of public slogans and mobilising 
messages to reflect Chinese tenets rather than Leninist demands. 
Public discourses are managed by the political leadership, but the return to tradition first 
manifested itself in a myriad ways in popular culture. In ideological matters, as in economic 
issues, political leaders appear to be responding to the people and their intense urge to 
express their own values and identity. This has come at an apposite moment. US 
expansionism appears to be faltering; the USA has elected a president who seems to want to 
concentrate on reviving America rather than converting the world. The EU has stopped 
expanding and, even if it does not disintegrate, is likely to prefer consolidation of good 
relations with other powers over proselytising. China’s renaissance is showing the rest of the 
world that all countries do not have to submit to one Anglo-American fate in order to survive 
and prosper; indeed, the Chinese model may be more suitable in some cases. There are to be 
multiple modernities and the homogenising power of transnational capitalism can be brought 
to heel.
Doubtless there are many other angles of Chinese life from which the return of Chineseness 
can be examined, but our modest revelations could encourage others to look further at a 
phenomenon which may rival in importance the economic revolution with which China has 
shaken the world over the past 30 years.
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